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I. Introduction
The international remittance has emerged as a most important source of
private capital flows for several developing countries (DCs) in recent
decades as it’s inflow to developing DCs reached $325 billion in 2010
against $30 billion in 1990 (World Bank, 2011). Particularly, Nepal has
experienced relatively even larger increase in emigration and remittance.
For instance, the annual flow of Nepalese people for work to the countries
other than India has increased from few thousand in early 1990s to about
300 thousand in 2010 (Department of Foreign Employment, [DOFE],
2011). The number would be much larger if we include migrants who are
working in India, with whom there is a reciprocal agreement to enter
without visa. As a result, the annual remittance inflow increased from $50
million in early 1990s to $3 billion in 2009 and remittance-GDP ratio went
up as large as one-quarter in 2009 (World Bank, 2011). Meanwhile, the
head count poverty declined remarkably from 42% to 31% during 19962004, despite the modest economic growth and political turbulence in one
hand, the inequality (measured by Gini coefficient) increased sharply from
0.34 to 0.41 during this period on the other (CBS, 2006, p. i-iii). Given
these developments, this research addresses the question: Is the increase in
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migration and remittance the main driving force behind the reduction in
poverty and the increase in inequality in Nepal?
To assess the impact of remittance on poverty and income distribution,
the previous studies have used two general approaches: (i) remittance as
‘exogenous transfer’ (see, for example, Stark, Taylor & Yitzhaki, 1986)
and (ii) remittance as ‘potential substitute’ for other household earnings
(e.g., Barham & Boucher, 1998). Although the results might vary with the
approaches used, and the statistical techniques adopted to generate
counterfactual consumption as well as the differences in the maturity of
migration-remittance process and sources of remittances, there are no
studies that disaggregate to account the evolution of the process over time
in a country across regions and source of remittances using the second
approach - the more flexible one.
So, our study attempts to answer whether the increased migration and
remittance is the main cause of decrease in poverty and increase in
inequality in the case of Nepal by examining how differences in
prevalence of migration and sources of remittances have diverse impacts
on poverty (magnitude) and inequality (magnitude and direction) over
time considering remittance as ‘potential substitute’. effects using
balanced panel data of 962 households from two rounds of Nepal Living
Standards Survey (NLSS) conducted by Central Bureau of Statistics
(CBS) of Nepal12, we apply fixed effects model to control of the
household fixed effects in contrast to most of the previous studies that had
used instrumental variables (IV) and Heckman Selection methods (see, for
example, Lokshin, Bontch-Osmolovskim, & Glinskaya, 2007; Zhu & Luo,
2010) to control for the endogeneity of remittance income.
II. Empirical Methodology
Following Bhattacharya (1985) and Stark (1991), we consider
migration-remittance process as a household welfare maximizing behavior
and use following fixed effects model to deal with potential endogeneity
of remittance:
ln(PCEit) = α + βRit +γXit +δGi + ηEi + dt + fi + εit

(1)

where, ln(PCE) is the natural logarithm of per capita consumption
(PCE) of a household i and measures household welfare, dt is a time
dummy, fi captures time invariant factors for each household and εit are
idiosyncratic errors that change across t as well as i. Rit is a remittance
12

The first round (NLSS I) was conducted in 1995/96 (hereafter 1996) while the
second round (NLSS II) was carried out in 2003/04 (hereafter 2004). For further details
on the sampling procedure see CBS (2004).
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related regressor that represents either a dummy for whether a household
received remittance or the log of one plus actual remittance income
received. The parameter of our interest, β, captures the gain in household
welfare, measured by log of per capita consumption, due to the migrationremittance decision. Xit is a set of household and community
characteristics. The household characteristics include household size and
its composition, characteristics of household head such as age, sex,
education level, migration history and occupation, per capita pension
income, dummies for the service flow of durables purchased at least one
year prior to the survey and dummies for agricultural land holding. We use
six regional dummies (Gi) to control for spatial premiums on consumption,
and migration costs associated with socio-physical proximities
(Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2008). We also use four binary indicators Ei to
control for caste and ethnicity characteristics. To capture community level
externalities on welfare, we use ward level mean household consumption,
and proportions of population above 15 years who were illiterate or passed
the high school level national exam (SLC), employed or self employed,
and engaged in agriculture or non-agriculture occupation.
Based on the above model (1), we use the fixed effects estimates to
construct counterfactual consumption patterns under two scenarios: (a) no
household receives remittance and (b) 1% increase in the proportion of
remittance receiving households with error term (εit) having student tdistribution with 30 degrees of freedom and heteroskedasticity and
generate 10,000 values of ln(PCE) as:

ln(PCEit ) = αˆ + βˆRit + γˆX it + δˆGit + fˆi + εˆit

(2)

where εˆit are random draws from the selected distribution and (
αˆ , βˆ , γˆ, δˆ, fˆ ) are given by the fixed effects estimator. The predicted values
i

of ln(PCE) for these households are used to compute mean per capita
household consumption, indices of poverty13 and inequality14 and analyze
the impact of overall and source-wise remittance (i.e. domestic, foreign,
Indian and other countries) on these indices at national and regional levels.
13

Following Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT, 1984), we use three main measures of
poverty – head count poverty (P0), poverty gap (P1) and poverty gap squared (P2) – to
measure the effects on incidence, depth and severity of poverty, respectively using both
national poverty lines [2,114 Kcal per day (NPR 5,089 per year) for 1996 and 2,144 Kcal
per day (NPR 5,216 per year at constant price of 1996) for 2004] and international
poverty line [PPP US$1/day at constant price of 1993 and its double].
14
We use the Gini index, a widely used measure, to explore the impacts of remittance
on income (consumption) distribution.
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III. Results
The fixed effects estimation15 results show that the coefficient of
remittance dummy is significant at 10% level: the per capita consumption
of remittance receiving households is 6.54% higher than that of nonrecipient households, other things being constant. The coefficient of
remittance income is also significantly positive (at 1% level): if per capita
remittance increases by 1%, then per capita consumption increases by
0.017%, other things being the same. The small elasticity value suggests
that our estimation might not capture the full welfare effect of remittance.
Table 1 shows simulation results for both remittance dummy and
remittance income models for 1996 and 2004. First, using the remittancedummy model, if no household receives remittance, the mean
consumption would decrease by 1.4% in 1996 and 2.1% in 2004 with
respect to baseline simulation values (Panel A and B). The results for the
remittance-income model are similar, but the magnitudes are about 50%
larger in both scenarios (Panel C and D).

15

The results are not shown here and may be available from the authors upon request.
We also do instrumental variable fixed effect estimation using the proportion of adult
population that is absent for more than 6 months during survey year and the proportion of
remittance receiving households as instruments. Hansen J-statistic and the KPLM
statistics indicate that the instruments are valid and relevant. The Sargan test suggests that
we do not find any endogeneity of remittance caused by time invariant factors.
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Table 1
Impacts of remittance on consumption, poverty and inequality by source of remittance
Measures

Baselin
e

No REM
C/F
A. Remittance – Dummy Model (in 1996):
7,295
Consumption Per Capita 7,400
43.52
Head Count (P0)
42.54
12.49
Poverty Gap (P1)
12.07
Poverty Gap Squared
4.89
(P2)
4.69
0.333
Gini Coefficient
0.333
B. Remittance - Dummy Model (in 2004):
9,258
Consumption Per Capita 9,452
31.32
Head Count (P0)
29.94
7.83
Poverty Gap (P1)
7.36
Poverty Gap Squared
2.80
(P2)
2.61
0.355
Gini Coefficient
0.354
C. Remittance - Income Model (in 1996):
Consumption Per Capita 7,396
7,227
Head Count (P0)
42.57
43.97

No DOM
REM
C/F
%∆

%∆

-1.41 7,341
2.29 43.05
3.42 12.27
4.26
4.78
-0.03 0.333

No IND
REM
C/F
%∆

No OTHR
REM
C/F
%∆

-0.80
1.19
1.63

7,360
43.06
12.3

-0.54 7,394
1.20 42.57
1.91 12.08

-0.07
0.06
0.06

1.93
-0.15

4.81
0.334

2.45
0.30

4.69
0.333

0.04
-0.09

-2.06 9,352
4.61 30.6
6.36 7.58
7.49
2.70
0.17 0.354

-1.06
2.21
3.02

9,389
30.6
7.60

-0.67 9,408
2.21 30.08
3.34 7.39

-0.47
0.49
0.43

3.61
0.00

2.71
0.356

3.97
0.54

2.62
0.353

0.40
-0.28

-2.28 7,298
3.30 43.32

-1.34
1.77

7,335
43.27

-0.83 7,384
1.64 42.59

-0.16
0.05
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Poverty Gap (P1)
Poverty Gap Squared
(P2)
Gini Coefficient

12.06

12.66

5.02

4.68
0.333

4.98
0.332

D. Remittance - Income Model (in 2004):
Consumption Per Capita 9,451
9,108
Head Count (P0)
30.00
32.28
Poverty Gap (P1)
Poverty Gap Squared
(P2)
Gini Coefficient

7.37

8.14

2.61
0.354

2.93
0.354

12.34

2.34

12.4

2.81

12.07

0.06

6.40 4.81
-0.39 0.332

2.79
-0.42

4.86
0.334

3.79
0.39

4.68
0.332

0.06
-0.21

-3.62
7.60
10.5
4
12.5
1
-0.14

9,286
31.04

-1.75
3.49

9,346
31.06

-1.11 9,359
3.56 30.32

-0.97
1.06

7.72

4.82

7.77

5.43

7.44

1.00

2.76
0.354

5.72
-0.14

2.78
0.357

6.65
0.82

2.63
0.352

0.96
-0.62

Source. Authors’ calculation using NLSS I and II panel data.
Note. DOM, FOR, IND, and OTHR are remittance from within Nepal, foreign countries, India and other countries (except
India), respectively. C/F is the scenario under which no household receives remittance from a particular destination:
DOM, FOR, IND or OTHR. % ∆ indicates the percentage change with respect to the baseline. Consumption per capita is
in NPR (constant price 1996). National poverty line is used16.

16

The results on counterfactual scenario (b), international poverty lines and regional level are not reported here and may be available upon
request.
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Next, regarding impacts of migration and remittance on poverty, based
on the national level poverty line and the remittance-dummy model, the
incidence of poverty (P0) would increase by 2.3% and 4.6% (respectively)
in 1996 and 2004, the depth of poverty (P1) by 3.4% and 6.4%
(respectively), and the severity of poverty (P2) by 4.3% and 7.5% (Panel
A and B). If we used the remittance-income model instead, the figures
would be larger: 3.3% and 7.6% increase for P0, 5% and 10.5% increase
for P1, and 6.4% and 12.5% increase for P2 in 1996 and 2004,
respectively (Panel C and D). The larger impact of remittance on the depth
and severity of poverty (P1, P2) than on the incidence of poverty (P0)
might be related to the uneven distribution of poor households among
migration destinations. For instance, to cope with food and employment
scarcity, ultra-poor households might migrate to the places that are less
costly such as India. So, even if small transfers from India do not bring the
poorest households above the poverty line (and so do not affect P0) at
least these can help to bring those household nearer to it (improving P1
and P2). Moreover, less poor households can afford to send a member to
relatively more costly and risky places. So, remittance helps to eradicate
poverty (i.e. improve P0) rather than just bringing those poor households
near the poverty line. The effects on all three FGT measures are about
two-third larger in the later year because of the sharp increase in migration
and the increase in the proportion of poor households in the migration
process.
The above findings are robust when we use an international poverty
line i.e. US$1/day for all FGT measures or double it. The estimated
impacts on poverty for US$1/day poverty line are slightly larger than
those for the national poverty line while that for US$ 2/day are about 50%
smaller than those for the national poverty line.
Furthermore, we split the effect of remittances from different sources
by constructing the counterfactual scenario under which no household
receives remittances from a particular source country. The results show
that the effect of foreign remittance on FGT measures is mostly larger than
that of domestic remittance in both years. If we further disaggregate
foreign remittance into India and other countries, then Indian remittance
contributes at least 80% (90% in 1996) of the impact of overall foreign
remittance (Table 1). The reason for the larger impact of Indian remittance
is that the ultra-poor mostly migrate to India, whereas most of the third
country migrants come from less poor (or richer) households. These
results hold true for scenario (b). Moreover, there is regional variation in
the impact of remittance on poverty: the regions that have higher
prevalence of remittance experience larger impacts.
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Finally, the inequality would decrease in both years but less in 2004 if
no households receives remittance indicating that as the migration process
becomes more mature, costs and risks involved in migration may be
reduced, as well as participation of the bottom quintile in this process may
be increased which is consistent with the results of Stark, et al. (1986) in
the case of Mexico. Although domestic remittance and other country
remittances increase inequality, the Indian remittance is found to be
income equalizer in both years.
IV. Conclusion
The econometric results show that the consumption is higher for
remittance receiving households and it increases with remittance income,
other things being the same. The simulation results show that if none of
the households received remittances, the incidence of poverty (P0),
measured by national poverty line, would have increased by at least 2.3%
and at most 3.3% in 1996 and at least 4.6% and at most 7.6% in 2004; the
lower bounds are for simulations using the remittance-dummy model
while the upper bounds are that for remittance-amount model. Impacts on
the depth (P1) and severity of poverty (P2) are even larger. Although
average remittance sent by a third country migrant is more than seven
times higher than that of Indian one, Indian migration is necessity for the
poorest households that experience severe credit limitations. So, Indian
remittance has a far larger impact on poverty reduction in comparison with
domestic and other countries’ remittance and it acts as an income
equalizer in contrast to adverse effects of remittances from Nepal and
other countries. The overall effect of remittances on income equality is
negative but this adverse effect has decreased over time. These stylized
facts agree with Stark, et al. (1986) and Taylor, et al. (2005).
The limitations of the study arise as consumption for a particular year
may not capture the full implications on household welfare, data are
limited to disaggregate remittance received from the absent member(s)
and relatives or friends and we only consider the direct impacts of
remittance rather than measuring the externalities of massive inflow of
remittances.
Policies that facilitate to switch the migrants of poor households who
are working in India to other countries might be effective to reduce
poverty sharply and improve equality. In the short run, programs on
migration credit and migration/remittance information dissemination for
bottom income group would be appropriate. Medium and long-term
policies such as educational investment and strengthening legal status of
contracts among potential migrants, manpower companies and foreign
employers would also be instrumental for poverty reduction.
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